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Financial Indiscipline in Zambia's Third Republic: The Role of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
 
PETER BURNELL∗
 
 
Contrary to the thesis that claims weak legislative power vis-à-vis the executive is essential if 
economic modernisation and development are to be driven forward in third world countries, 
Zambia's developmental interests would be served by making the powers of parliamentary 
oversight of the public finances more effective. The problematic of 'financial indiscipline' in 
the public sector is analysed in terms of a nest of principal-agent relationships, between: 
legislature and executive; political executive and bureaucratic executive; Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development and the spending arms of government. Evidence from the Public 
Accounts Committee is used to illustrate the case for more enforceable mechanisms whereby 
government can be made accountable for the public finances. At the same time it is argued that 
more wide-ranging political changes are necessary if there is to be a significant reduction in 
'financial indiscipline'. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The thesis that government unencumbered by a strong legislative is essential for development 
in developing countries makes a presumption that the executive is committed to 
developmental goals for the benefit of society. It assumes the government raises and applies 
resources efficiently and effectively to that end. Any limitations in the shape of shortages of 
finance, relevant bureaucratic skills and expertise will be lessened over time, as a result of 
development. This article shows how empirical evidence from Zambia is highly damaging to 
the thesis. While other observers have identified high-level political corruption as a serious 
and growing problem, basing their accounts on confidential and journalistic sources especially, 
far less publicity has been given to the culture of 'financial indiscipline' running throughout the 
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public service. Documentary evidence exists in the published findings of the Auditor-General 
and Parliament's Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in particular. 'Financial indiscipline' 
means both behaviour that is undeniably corrupt and a broader complex of attitudes that lead 
to the unauthorised misuse or wasteful use of scarce public resources, money specifically. 
Although it may or may not be intended to procure personal gain 'financial indiscipline' 
invariably ignores or breaches the regulatory framework. The Zambian case shows how the 
absence of effective Parliamentary accountability allows these endemic shortcomings in the 
executive to persist. Effective accountability means not just the scrutiny of public expenditure 
by Parliament. There must also be some institutional mechanism, of which Parliament could 
be but a part that requires the executive to take note of and respond appropriately to the 
recommendations of Parliament. In regard to evidence of financial irregularities, effective 
accountability would mean that the government should face a serious possibility of incurring 
political costs and/or legal sanctions, in the event of not taking adequate corrective and 
remedial action.  
There is a nest of principal-agent relationships in which agency problems arise when, 
in some instances agents act in accordance with the principal's wishes and in other instances 
their conduct is at variance with the same: both cases can be problematic. The political 
representatives are central to the problem in as much as they appear to regard public spending 
as an instrument for maintaining and exercising power, not simply a tool for promoting 
national development. Power is sought through traditional neo-patrimonial and clientelistic 
patterns of relationship. This adds a distinctive African flavour to an electoral democracy in 
which there is a strong concentration of power in the presidency. Although institutional 
strengthening of the Auditor-General's Office and Public Accounts Committee and capacity-
building in the administration are essential to improved management of the public finances, 
they are unlikely to be sufficient. For in general the Parliament's powers are weak - some 
Members say it is just a rubber stamp; and a journalistic source calls it a 'useless house'.i So, 
even the addition of a more balanced party system and a greater representation of opposition 
parties in the legislature may well not be enough. But aside from the constitutional balance of 
power between executive and legislative, there also needs to be a shift in the political and 
administrative culture to a situation where policy performance measured by the yardstick of 
the national good is given priority as the litmus test of good government. 
The article proceeds in four parts: a briefing on contemporary Zambia; evidence from 
the Public Accounts Committee plus supplementary evidence from other parliamentary 
committees; an examination of where responsibility for the 'financial indiscipline' lies, and 
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major winners and losers; and the shortcomings of the budget process. It concludes with an 
assessment of future prospects in the light of recent proposals for Parliamentary reform. 
 
ZAMBIA TODAY 
Zambia is a unitary state. The constitution prescribes a presidential form of democracy with 
strong executive powers together with a unicameral legislature. The Parliament, which is the 
supreme law-making body, consists of the President and the National Assembly comprising 
150 elected seats and eight seats filled by presidential nomination. Parliament's powers include 
the power to vote expenditure, approve taxation measures and scrutinise government 
administration. The government consists of the President of the Republic, who enjoys his own 
electoral mandate, a Vice-President who is also Leader of the House and a cabinet and other 
ministers and deputy ministers, all of whom must be drawn from Parliament.  
In terms of the schema for scoring legislative powers proposed by Shugart and Carey, 
Zambia's constitution bestows one of the strongest varieties of presidentialism of any electoral 
democracy.ii Even so, government is supposed to justify its actions, policies and programmes 
before Parliament. This is done through inter alia Parliamentary Questions to ministers, 
motions, the submission of annual reports by public sector organisations, and the scrutiny 
activities of various parliamentary committees. Chief among these in respect of public 
expenditure is the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), which acts on the basis of reports 
received annually from the Auditor-General's Office (AG). A Committee on Local 
Governance, Housing and Chiefs' Affairs oversees spending by city, municipal and district 
councils. In addition there is a Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour to oversee the 
activities of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) and three related 
ministries (Commerce, Trade and Industry; Mines and Mineral Development; Labour and 
Social Security). Whereas the oldest of the committees is the PAC, the most recent is the 
Estimates Committee, whose mandate is to examine the government's budgetary process and 
expenditure. At the time of writing the Estimates Committee had produced its first report only, 
which was presented to the house in November 2000. 
Zambia is a small country of around 10 million people that since the mid-1970s has 
seen average incomes fall to levels among the very lowest in the world. Over 90 per cent of 
the population are reckoned to exist on the equivalent of under US$2 a day. Gross public 
external indebtedness rose to one of the highest levels, on a per capita basis. The government's 
spending comprises around 40 per cent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product); and although its 
fiscal annual fiscal deficits have been reducing they still represent around 2.3 per cent of GDP.  
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The state has only a small tax base (tax receipts represent around 17 per cent of GDP), made 
all the narrower by the trade liberalisation which since the early 1990s has eliminated much 
traditional import tariff and duty-based revenues. So the government depends greatly on 
international multilateral and bilateral donors to fund public expenditures. Donor pledges 
averaged over 30 per cent of the public budget during the years 1994-99 and virtually all of the 
government's capital expenditure is financed in this way.  Given the absence of sustained 
improvement in economic output and in social development in the 1990s, and notwithstanding 
significant macro-economic reforms and sweeping privatisation, it would be misleading to say 
Zambia is truly developing. One glimmer of hope is the prospect of early qualification for debt 
relief worth up to US$3.8billion (out of a total debt stock of $6.8 billion), spread over 22 
years. In this way the donors' heavily indebted poor countries initiative would release more of 
the government's income for spending on the many heavy domestic social and economic 
priorities. In such circumstances a careful and cost-effective application of public expenditure 
becomes an issue of even more pressing concern. The government must create confidence that 
the financial relief would be applied in the best interests of the people, in order to meet the 
donors' conditions. 
Even so, it was precisely with countries like Zambia in mind that the thesis favouring a 
strong executive and weak legislature emerged as part of the so-called modernisation school of 
development.iii The executive would then be able to take tough decisions on spending 
priorities. It would prioritise investment in the physical and human capital infrastructure so 
essential to development, at the expense of private consumption. In contrast a relatively 
powerful legislature could potentially obstruct the decision-making process and thwart needful 
action by the executive.  In a competitive multi-party environment it would all too likely lead 
to an escalation of demands for public spending particularly for items of immediate 
consumption, and especially near general elections. In fact since 1991 Zambia has had an only 
weakly competitive party system, more like a predominant party system.iv The constitutional 
provision for a powerful executive has been reinforced by the dominant position the governing 
party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), has enjoyed in the National 
Assembly since 1991. It won 125 and 131 of the elected seats in the 1991 and 1996 general 
elections as well as winning the presidency very comfortably. 
However, the fallacy of the modernisation thesis is that it presumes government is 
committed to pursuing public goals for the public good and will strive do so efficiently and 
effectively inter alia through a well judged use of the public purse. In Zambia, not only have 
analysts pointed out the presence of high-level political corruptionv but the findings of 
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authoritatively constituted bodies for monitoring and scrutinising the public finances also fail 
to bear out this presumption. On the contrary, the evidence they provide indicates a problem of 
'financial indiscipline' that is much more widespread.  
 
THE OFFICE OF AUDITOR-GENERAL AND THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE 
The President appoints the Auditor-General. The constitution requires this nomination to be 
subject to ratification by Parliament. The AG's mission statement is 'to promote accountability, 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the collection, disbursement and utilisation of funds 
and other resources for the benefit of society'.vi The Office has seven divisions covering 
different government responsibilities and four regional offices. While the production of an 
annual report is a constitutional requirement the AG can also issue interim and special reports, 
such as in its 1998 report on the disastrous financial position of the University of Zambia, 
which owed debts exceeding K23 billion. Since 1994 it has been entitled to undertake value-
for-money or performance audits - something the PAC began to apply in 1998 when it 
investigated the considerable sums ($27 million per annum by 1997) spent on maintaining the 
foreign missions of the diplomatic service. (The PAC found no value-for-money objectives to 
test, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not provided the missions with a mission 
statement: they had been given no instruction to promote Zambia's economic interests, for 
example).vii In December 1997 the AG signed an aid-funded programme for capacity-
building, with the Norwegian government, which is still on-going. Views differ on how much 
progress has actually been made since then. One perception is that the profile of both the AG 
and PAC has been increasing, such that Controlling Officers in the ministries are now less 
inclined to delegate to subordinates the task of responding to the AG's inquiries. Also, the 
reports of the AG, like those of the PAC attract some media attention. A brief selection of the 
reports' findings is published in the state-owned and government-run daily newspapers, the 
Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail at the time they are released  The more critical 
privately-owned papers, notably The Post (daily) and The Monitor (weekly) use the material 
more in the vein of investigative journalism, by emphasising the most critical findings and 
revisiting them on subsequent occasions as they try to harry the government.  The foreign 
embassies in Lusaka take great interest in the findings, which may have a bearing on the 
international donors' negotiations with the government and the construction of various aid 
conditionalities. A possible inference is that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the 
government to ignore the bad publicity that can arise from the reports or avoid the imperative 
to formulate some sort of response.viii At the same time it seems that none of the 
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recommendations of a 1996 restructuring study of the Auditor-General's office, written by the 
consultants Coopers and Lybrand, have yet been implemented.ix   
The PAC, which the Standing Orders of the National Assembly style one of three 
General Purpose Committees (the other two being the Committee on Delegated Legislation 
and the Committee on Government Assurances) dates from 1965 and is the most senior  
Parliamentary watchdog committee. The PAC is mandated to examine the accounts showing 
the appropriation of sums granted by the National Assembly to meet public expenditure and 
the AG's Report on these accounts, and to exercise powers conferred on it under the 
Constitution of Zambia (Article 103:5). Controlling Officers in the departments and ministries 
(which usually means Permanent Secretaries) and chief executive officers of parastatal entities 
are required to submit memoranda on paragraphs raised in AG reports, which then provide a 
focus for the PAC's own inquiries.  
The PAC consists of nine members appointed by the National Assembly from among 
its members. The Minister for Finance and Economic Development attends only the first 
meeting, when the members elect the chair. Although the chair has on occasions been drawn 
from outside the ruling party the government does not accept the idea, adopted in some 
Commonwealth parliamentary systems, that this should always be the case. The turnover of 
membership appears to have been marginally greater than in parliament's other investigatory 
committees (which in 1999 were increased in number to 11 departmentally-oriented 
committees). But usually at minimum three members will be retained from the previous year, 
and it is from their number that the chair will be appointed. There is a suspicion among some 
opposition MPs that in some years certain well-qualified colleagues have been kept off the 
committee in preference for 'passengers', in order to reduce its effectiveness.x But the 
argument that continuity of membership is particularly valuable to enhancing the PAC is a 
more substantial. Like the other Parliamentary committees the PAC appears to benefit from a 
cross-partisan - even no-partisan - approach. There is no tradition of presenting minority 
reports within the context of the main reports; and even committee chairs drawn from the 
ruling party have agreed to and forcefully presented some damning criticisms of the 
administration on the floor of the house. The Clerk's Office provides an officer to service each 
of the parliamentary committees who may in turn make use of the entire research team 
numbering around ten officers. There is a general acceptance that the committee structure is 
greatly under-resourced; for instance the PAC has sometimes been forced to curtail field visits 
due to lack of funds.xi  
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Like Parliament as a whole the PAC's impact on government was very limited during 
the Second Republic (1972-91) because the de jure one-party state subordinated government 
to the then ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Cabinet, whose 
members were increasingly drawn from outside the National Assembly was secondary to the 
executive organs of the party; and power was concentrated in the hands of President Kaunda. 
The return to multi-party politics in 1991 and the expectation, initially, that Zambia would 
adopt a much more democratic form and transparent style of government and would honour 
the principle of accountability, could have enhanced the importance of the PAC. Alas, while 
the AG and PAC deserve credit for their performance in scrutinising the accounts and 
producing very revealing reports, the reports themselves present an unchanging picture of lax 
expenditure control, misuse of public funds and assorted financial irregularities, 
misappropriation and the like, throughout the whole decade. The reports paint much the same 
picture year after year. They not infrequently make tart remarks about the absence of 
improvement in the management of the public finances in spite of the critical observations, 
constructive recommendations, assorted warnings and threats issued by the Committee on 
many previous occasions.. This record speaks volumes both about substantive shortcomings in 
the executive and the weakness of parliamentary oversight - a mechanism for accountability 
that lacks the means to ensure enforcement.  
 The following are typical of the different kinds of 'financial indiscipline' that PAC 
reports from second half of the 1990s have highlighted in the line ministries and other 
government agencies: failure to observe the correct procedures for regularising excess 
expenditures as laid down by the Finance (Control and Management) Act, 1980xii; concealing 
information from the Auditors; failure to keep records of expenditure; unsupported or 
inadequately supported payments; misapplication of funds; diversion of monies to 
unauthorised objects; blatant flouting of approved procedures for public tenders; payments 
made for goods never received or received too late to meet the intended purpose; collusion 
between purchasing officers and suppliers for the purpose of mutual personal gain; poor 
maintenance of stores; unauthorised award of salaries and allowances; the unplanned 
recruitment of workers; failure to contest doubtful compensation claims; failure to comply 
with court orders ordering compensation; failure to recover loans; going ahead with a project 
that was 'politically sensitive' in spite of a background of serious financial problems.   The 
non-submission of accounts by parastatal bodies has been rife (although contrary to the law), 
but 'so far no grants payable to the organisations have been withheld for not submitting the 
accounts for audit'.xiii
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At the state electricity company ZESCO for example, the PAC concluded that financial 
management 'appears to have collapsed completely…financial regulations are either non-
existent or totally ignored'; as a result ZESCO failed to collect large amounts of revenue and 
lost 'colossal sums', a situation which if anything continues to deteriorate. The Board of the 
Kariba North Bank Company, which came under ZESCO's umbrella, did not even meet 
between 1995 and 1998!xiv At the University of Zambia the administration was found to have 
done nothing about the mismanagement of public funds and disregard of financial regulations 
'because they wanted to personally benefit from a free for all situation'.xv The 1997 PAC 
report (for 1994) objected to the way local politicians were allowed to influence the 
distribution of hammer mills (for grinding maize into flour), under a programme intended to 
target eligible local women's groups. The programme, funded by the Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Services but for which there was no express provision in the 
Estimates approved by Parliament, was so badly executed that the PAC judged it was bound to 
encourage the beneficiaries to ignore the repayment obligations on the loans. The Permanent 
Secretary defended the politicians' involvement: they merely 'assisted their constituencies in 
meeting their felt needs'.xvi More generally, the lament that the Budget Office in the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) 'in many instances, is compelled to release 
funds not provided for in the budget due to political and social reasons' runs throughout the 
reports. In the words of one PAC chair, this practice 'severely compromises the control 
process'.xvii
 
FURTHER EVIDENCE 
Parliament's committee system was restructured in 1999 to ensure that every government 
department, ministry and agency was shadowed by a committee charged with the following 
responsibilities: oversee its activities, carry out detailed scrutiny, make appropriate 
recommendations to the House and to the government on the mandate, management and 
operations; make, if deemed necessary, recommendations to the government on the need to 
review certain policies and/or existing legislation; consider any bills that may be referred by 
the House; consider in detail the annual reports. The Standing Orders Committee (dominated 
by senior government ministers) decides the membership of all watchdog committees, in 
theory paying regard to gender balancing and an appropriate level of representation from 
outside the ruling party. The committees begin sitting in April or May and present their reports 
to the House for adoption late in the annual session, in November or December, possibly 
holding meetings for up to 15 times during the meantime. At the time of writing two years of 
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reports from the newly restructured committees were available. The government is required to 
make a response to the house within 60 days of receipt of a committee report, in the form of an 
Action-Taken Report, which is normally presented by the Vice-President. In the past there has 
been much slippage and delay in the delivering of Action-Taken Reports. 
The Committee on Local Governance, Housing and Chiefs' Affairs (before 1999 called 
the Committee on Local Administration) is unique among these committees. For it continues 
to devote its reports to the audited accounts of councils (as tabled by the Minister of Local 
Government and Housing) and the AG's annual reports on the accounts of councils. Councils 
are obliged to prepare accounts in accordance with the Public Audit Act of 1980. Thus for 
example the Committee's report for 2000 reviewed 22 district and municipal councils out of 
the total of 72 local government authorities, along with the Minister's annual report. The report 
also included consideration of Action-Taken Reports by the government on previous reports of 
the Committee and its predecessor. The committee met 13 times during the year and took 
submissions from Principal Officers in local councils and the Permanent Secretary from the 
Ministry, and, in an effort to reduce the backlog also considered two Action-Taken Reports for 
1999 as well as comparable reports for 1996, 1997 and 1998.  
If anything the contents of these reports make even more dismal reading than those 
produced by the PAC. The tone set by the statutory audit for the Municipal Council of 
Luanshya is illustrative. Luanshya is a Copperbelt town whose constituency MP, Ben Mwila, 
was for nine years a powerful cabinet minister and close ally of President Chiluba. The 
Committee discovered that the Council had failed to prepare annual Income and Expenditure 
Statements and Balance Sheets for the period 1st January 1995 - 3 December 1998. There were 
no monthly accounts either - a further contravention of the Local Government Act. In fact 
financial malpractice and negligence are so pervasive throughout local government as a whole 
that the system has deteriorated to a condition of near terminal crisis. There are numerous 
examples of the following: unvouched expenditure; missing payments vouchers; unsupported 
payment of wages and salaries; under-banking of receipts and failure to bank revenues; 
unretired imprest; missing receipt books; failure to collect rates; the funding of non-existent 
projects; fraud; illegal payments; misapplication of funds and various irregularities in 
procurement; diversion of funds, advances given illegally to non-council employees; irregular 
payment of allowances; as well as the non-production of financial reports. In urban councils 
the average delay in auditing accounts appears to be around eight years (in 1997 the most 
recent audit by one council was 1971). The Committee voiced special concern over the misuse 
of monies from the Constituency Development Funds. These Funds are meant to support 
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development projects decided at the local level. In a number of cases they appear to function 
as 'slush funds' for purely party activities, controlled by MMD activists who dominate the 
local committees deciding the expenditure. There was also evidence of MPs making use of the 
monies for personal ends. Another general finding concerned the tenants of council houses 
who opted to acquire the property under a central government directive to local authorities to 
dispose of their housing stock. Many had ceased paying rent but had not paid for the property 
(some had even sold the property on, for a higher price than the value owing to the council). 
The local authorities lost out on all counts. Although central government has been 
instrumental in bringing about the financial crisis in local government and has allowed the 
situation to develop unchecked, it disclaims responsibility for sorting out the mess. 
The Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour produced three reports in 2000, one 
of which, the Review of the Privatisation of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited, was 
not adopted by the whole house (and hence is not on public release) when it came before the 
house in November 2000.  The government mobilised its majority in the National Assembly to 
throw the report back to the Committee.  The government claimed there were errors and 
inconsistencies in the report. The report, in addition to complaining about the government's 
failure to take effective action on the resolutions in its first report (1999), allegedly contained a 
very damaging account of the government's handling of the privatisation process. It repeated 
charges endorsed by the Attorney-General of illegal behaviour in the disposal of non-core 
assents, 'asset-stripping' and failure to account for monies realised from the sale of assets. The 
President of the Republic was implicated in the decision process over Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines' (ZCCM) privatisation. The procedure was said to have departed from the terms 
of the Privatisation Act, through circumventing the Board of the Zambia Privatisation Agency, 
the membership of which should by law be approved by Parliamentary. Concern about the 
misapplication of proceeds from privatisation sales and for instance their use to subsidise the 
government-run Zambia Daily Mail constitute a separate line of complaint. The Committee's 
report is reputed to have recommended the establishment of an independent public inquiry to 
examine issues of public interest in the management and divestiture of ZCCM assets and the 
realisation and utilisation of the proceeds. The recommendation was that the inquiry would 
report to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) for further action, as deemed necessary.xviii
 
ANALYSIS 
First it is helpful to understand that there is a nest of principal - agent relationships bound up 
in these issues of public finance and accountability. While the ultimate principal actor is 
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society, and government is society's agent, Parliament - a device to render government 
accountable - is supposed to represent the principal, the people. Whereas the PAC clearly acts 
in behalf of Parliament, the AG's place, in contrast, is contested. It describes itself as an agent 
of parliament: after all, the institution was established by Act of Parliament and the audit is a 
way of checking the government's reports to Parliament.  But the power of appointment lies 
with the president, subject to ratification by parliament, and in the first instance the AG 
delivers its report to the President, who then lays it before the house. The Office of AG is 
actually part of the civil service; the executive determines the AG's budget and the Auditor-
General himself has no direct control over staff movements in and out. The AG has no powers 
to take punitive action against the executive where it finds evidence of misbehaviour. At times 
not only have senior government spokesmen referred to the AG as an agent of the government 
whose task is to help the executive, but this has been the perception of some MPs also. Their 
confidence in an institution that they see as being 'under the government' is affected 
accordingly. In 1996 the government rejected a recommendation of the Constitutional Review 
Commission that the AG be styled an officer of the National Assembly. The Commission 
believed that removal of the link with the Presidency would enhance the AG's effectiveness, 
especially if security of tenure was granted and the conditions of service and funding 
allocations were determined by a committee of the house independently of the executive. 
Within the executive there are a number of principal-agent relationships: between the 
political executive and the bureaucratic executive; between the MOFED on the one side and, 
on the other side the Controlling Officers in ministries, departments, parastatals and other 
government agencies; and between the Controlling Officers and subordinate accounting 
officers, and between the last and more junior functionaries in the administration. The extent 
to which, at any level the behaviour of an agent owes to the intervention or example set by a 
principal, or instead defies a principal, can be difficult to establish from the outside. The same 
is true of whether the principals' own conduct has been legitimate or, instead has directed 
agents to behave in ways contrary to the regulations. Put simply, who should be blamed when 
things go wrong, and how do we know?  These are the questions that the AG and PAC 
endeavour to address. At times their inquiries appear to have met with obfuscation. And while 
their findings indicate that 'financial indiscipline' is highly diffuse, the disposition of many of 
the reports has been to focus most closely on the Controlling Officers. For example in 1998 
the Committee found it 'incredibly and deeply regrettable that many controlling officers, if not 
all, have very scanty knowledge of some vital concepts in use in the financial management 
realm'. In 1999 it remarked, again, on 'the lack of interest by the Controlling Officers in the 
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financial affairs of their institution'.xix  For example 'savings' and 'appropriation-in-aid' were 
widely misunderstood concepts - not surprising, perhaps, given the dearth of trained expertise. 
As of December 1997 Zambia had only 511 qualified accountants registered and recognised 
by the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants, and of these, 416 were Zambians, of whom 
only four were working for the government. xx
The account so far might seem to indicate that the issue is not primarily one of 
executive-legislative relations at all but is something internal to the executive, possibly the 
bureaucratic executive alone. Surely the principal, the political executive could be presumed to 
have an interest in addressing the failings?  For wouldn't a firmer and more effective control of 
public spending maximise the government's chances of achieving its general policy 
objectives? And that in turn would enhance its prospects of retaining or increasing its appeal 
with the voters, and thereby promote the chances for re-election. What is more, there seems to 
be a simple remedy to the problem: make the requisite personnel changes and/or provide 
suitable staff training and development courses, particularly at the level of Controlling Officer. 
Resources could be made available to address the chronic shortage of financial skills. For 
these areas of need invite precisely the sort of technical and financial support the international 
donors are keen to offer. This is especially true of the multilateral donors, who concentrate on 
'non-political' assistance and are enthusiastic about capacity-building programmes for 'good 
governance'.  
Furthermore the MOFED might be thought to have a particular interest in attracting 
precisely this kind of technical help. MOFED's capability to achieve its formal institutional 
objectives and, just as important, maximise its power relative to the rest of the government 
bureaucracy would be served by the presence of a reliable network of Controlling Officers and 
effective system of public expenditure control. No longer would it have to rely on the AG and 
PAC to search out financial irregularities in the farthest reaches of the administration. The AG 
and PAC could themselves be construed as allies, not enemies. Indeed, speaking as Minister 
for Finance and Economic Development Edith Nawakwi referred to the PAC as 'partners to 
my ministry in managing public funds prudently'.xxi On the one hand a more robust approach 
to enforcing expenditure control might risk alienating the spending departments from MOFED 
and render MOFED politically isolated, which is a disincentive to making the improvements. 
But the fact is that MOFED routinely upsets some political colleagues anyway. For it 
invariably pares back budget requests and declines to release all the monies that have been 
given Parliamentary approval (that is, it enforces under-spending).  During the year the 
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Finance Minister frequently faces special requests for extra spending from MPs on the floor of 
the house, and has to disappoint many.  
There are of course other reasons to explain the need to enforce under-spending in 
some departments.  For one there are the excessively optimistic estimations of likely 
government income, and for another the unreliable nature of flows from foreign donors. 
Donors have been known to withhold promised aid for such reasons as dissatisfaction at the 
government's administration of the public finances. On occasions they have simply been late 
in disbursing promised money, or have disengaged from ministries that proved unable to 
provide matching or counterpart funds - perhaps occasioned by over-spending on different 
budget heads in their own or some other department. Capital investment is usually the main 
casualty in these situations. That is why the government's public investment programme for 
2000-2002 carries forward many so-called priority programmes and projects which had not 
been implemented from the previous report, for 1995-97.xxii  
Then there is the failure of government officials to collect domestic non-tax revenues 
effectively, which has been highlighted in PAC reports. This is another aspect of financial 
indiscipline. In 1997 for instance only nine of the 24 ministries and departments that collect 
fees for services rendered reached their estimated targets. The average collection rate reached 
67 per cent only because just three ministries greatly exceeded their targets.xxiii Far from most 
targets having been set unrealistically high, the PAC found evidence of more disturbing 
reasons. For instance its 2000 Report on the Collection and Management of Government 
Revenue commented that the 'work attitude is totally unacceptable and highly questionable' 
among toll fee collectors at border posts. It expressed 'utmost disappointment and concern at 
the unacceptable working and reporting arrangements' of the Road Traffic Commission 
headquarters: 'such unethical arrangements, which are deliberately designed to deny the 
Government huge amounts of revenue, are totally unacceptable and deserve the strongest 
condemnation and abhorrence'.xxiv The failure to bank revenues once collected is typical, as 
has been the slowness of commercial banks to send banked revenues to the Bank of Zambia.  
Unlike in say Botswana, where the Office of Accountant General has full autonomy to 
supervise and monitor the collection and management of government revenues, the 
corresponding officer in Zambia is ranked below Permanent Secretary and has negligible 
authority. There have also been shortfalls in the sums that should have been received from 
privatisation. The reasons include the sale of assets on deferred terms,xxv non-compliance by 
purchasers with the terms of agreement and other dubious practices referred to by the 
Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour. Most of the unpaid tax (debt) is actually owed 
 13
by public sector organisations, according to the PAC. Even so, the Zambia Revenue Authority, 
which in the early 1990s was restructured with technical assistance from Britain, fails to 
capture 'briefcase businessmen', the large informal sector of the economy, although it claims to 
meet its targets for tax collection  
 
IDENTIFYING RESPONSIBILITY 
The Controlling Officers have provided a convenient scapegoat during investigations into the 
culture of 'financial indiscipline'. In the PAC's view they appear to feel no remorse at being 
remonstrated by the Committee year in, year out.  However, not only does the government's 
slack performance over the collection of non-tax revenues suggest the problem is more 
extensive, but at least some Permanent Secretaries are in fact held in considerable esteem by 
independent observers and foreign advisers, who work alongside. There are several reasons to 
conclude that the true nature of the problem is, then more complex. 
First there is the stock response that the chief culprits are at lower levels of the 
bureaucracy and that in their role as principals the Controlling Officers lack the authority and 
the means to impose more professional conduct by subordinates. The disciplinary procedures 
against officials suspected of misbehaviour, including those against Controlling Officers 
themselves, are said to be lengthy and cumbersome and hence little used.xxvi Also, good 
Permanent Secretaries are hard-pressed to attend to all their obligations precisely because the 
middle levels of administration provide only thin or unreliable support: the monitoring of 
performance further down the line has to take a back seat. 
Second, while successive political heads of MOFED have promised to take a tougher 
line with Controlling Officers there appears to have been very little effective action. The 
Secretary to the Treasury in the Treasury Minutes on PAC Reports (the equivalent of Action-
Taken Reports on the reports of other parliamentary committees) routinely adopts an 
apologetic tone, endorsing many of the Committee's points and saying that its  
recommendations are 'noted'. It is aware of many civil servants' 'lack of honesty, integrity and 
willingness and readiness to accept responsibility to do the job'.xxvii But not until 1998 did the 
Treasury Minutes report on the implementation of PAC recommendations arising from AG 
reports for 1989 through to 1993. At most they offer vaguely worded claims about making 
progress in resolving the issues raised or about proceeding further with inquiries and the like. 
They fail to report back on issues where presumably MOFED has taken no action at all; and 
on occasions MOFED resorts to the excuse that lack of funds precludes a speedier response. 
The PAC finds all of this unacceptable. Clearly, MOFED is part of the problem. The PAC 
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claims to be 'baffled by the wanton disregard of financial regulations displayed by some 
accountants' in MOFED.xxviii It says it cannot make sense of MOFED's persistent failure to 
review the effectiveness of its own internal control systems. The PAC is indeed right to 
wonder how MOFED could be expected to exercise punitive action against Controlling 
Officers in line ministries when it too flouts with impunity the same regulatory regime.xxix A 
very plausible inference is that the status quo actually serves the political power that MOFED 
represents. It enables the Finance Minister to condone over-spending in some areas of 
government relative to the Estimates approved by Parliament, where political interests dictate, 
even though monies may have to be withheld from other activities in order to maintain some 
overall fiscal balance or contain the public deficit.  
Thus administrative shortcomings and a shortage of expertise within the bureaucratic 
executive are only part of the problem; another important element has been a lack of political 
will to address the  'financial indiscipline' or its underlying causes. Put differently there is 
complicity by powerful political figures in the executive in the way resources are misused. 
Permanent Secretaries in line departments act as their principals require; the political boss 
counts for more than the auditor.xxx There are many hints of this in the committee's reports 
although they tend to be sotto voce.  Take for example the experience of the Public Service 
Reform Programme (PSRP). This is a donor-driven retrenchment programme that has the aim 
of reducing government's recurrent expenditure, thereby releasing revenue both for investment 
and to enable higher salaries to be offered to attract high calibre personnel to the bureaucracy. 
The government says the programme is responsible for lowering morale and spreading 
indiscipline in the public service. However the PAC found that in the early years the PSRP 
was sabotaged by political interference from Cabinet Office, which eroded the authority, 
powers and entitlements of the programme's Director-General. Then, after the World Bank 
became impatient to see progress, the government proceeded to spend in one year four times 
the amount it had earmarked for the programme in the annual budget. Resources were diverted 
from other essential expenditure heads.  Subsequently the Committee on Government 
Assurances cited 'apparent undue political influence' on heads of department and the 
operations of the civil service and discovered that despite a substantial reduction of employees 
on the payroll by 1999 there was no corresponding reduction in the wage bill, due to financial 
mismanagement.xxxi  
A different kind of example, investigated by the Committee on Economic Affairs and 
Labour in 2000 concerns the commercial banking sector. Beginning in 1995 Zambia has 
witnessed the failure of more than seven commercial banks, such as Prudence Bank, the owner 
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and director of which was an MMD official. In 1995 Meridien Biao bank moved $90 million 
to offshore accounts in the Bahamas before its collapse (in May 2001 the donors made 
'clarification' of these events a precondition for releasing further balance of payments 
supportxxxii). Departments and public bodies like ZESCO that had been directed to deposit 
public money with some of the banks that failed, without authorisation from the Secretary to 
the Treasury, lost heavily. Some politically important people had accounts with banks that 
were allowed to borrow from the government just prior to their collapse: between 1995 and 
1999 government 'intervention loans' to the banks amounted to K900 million, much of it now 
presumed to have left the country. At their closure the banks owed a total of more than K104 
billion to the Bank of Zambia (the figure was down to K70 billion by mid-1999, after the sale 
of assets and debt recovery).xxxiii  
On a smaller scale is the Auditor-General's recent exposure of the misuse of Ministry 
of Defence procurement procedures to provide campaign materials for the MMD. The AG 
added, significantly, 'There was no evidence that the controlling officer had authorised the 
diversion of the materials' - materials delivered from the supplier, the Ministry of Defence's 
Mulungushi Textiles, to the residence of Ben Mwila, Minister for Defence and MMD party 
treasurer at the time.xxxiv  Just as harmful as such interventions by political heads can be the 
cases of inactivity and non-decision. To illustrate, three different individuals (Mwila being one 
of them) held the post of Minister of Energy and Water Development during the period 
covered by the PAC's review of the appalling financial performance at ZESCO, in 2000. None 
of the ministerial changes appears to have come about as a result of that performance. Instead 
the AG judged the Ministry to have failed in its obligation to give due guidance through the 
Minister's power of appointment of the ZESCO board. xxxv  
All in all there is considerable evidence that 'financial indiscipline' enjoys active 
connivance from senior government figures and is an entrenched feature of the politico-
administrative culture. While negligence by Controlling Officers might explain some of the 
reported instances there are also occasions when they are acting under orders, or have been 
overruled. We must remember that in Zambia as in many parts of Africa neo-patrimonialism 
and clientelistic arrangements provide a deeply rooted way of life, with origins that predate 
colonial rule; personal loyalties formed around the exchange of favours take precedence over 
legal contractual regulations. In this context a discretionary approach to using public 
resources, and latitude in ignoring wholly or in part the formal procedures governing public 
spending decisions and disbursements, are embedded ways of maintaining relationships of 
power.  A reasonable presumption is that this culture within the political executive provides 
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opportunities for personal gain. But what is less often remarked is that, in a system where 
patronage cascades, it provides the top leadership with a weapon of control that has a powerful 
reach. For when the 'big man' starts to squeeze the 'middle man' the latter's ability to command 
the loyalty of his/her clients is also impaired. 
 A notable example was the extensive practice of large scale borrowing from the state's 
Food Reserve Agency (FRA) for purchases of maize and fertiliser, in which at least 38 
ministers and deputy ministers, 84 MPs and 37 opposition politicians took part. They were 
able to use these benefits to 'purchase' local political support and social standing. But their 
unpaid debts to the FRA, totalling K16 billion, subsequently featured in steps by the President 
to inhibit colleagues from disobeying his wishes where the President's own political interests 
were at stake, by the simple expedient of threatening to call in the loans.xxxvi The FRA's bad 
financial state in turn destroyed its capability to offer security to international agencies that 
might have been prepared to finance bulk fertiliser imports. That has meant the government is 
repeatedly unable to make fertiliser available to farmers at the start of the growing season, 
with predictably adverse consequences for the agricultural yield.  In most years Zambia 
continues to experience a large food deficit in maize, the staple crop.  
 
WINNERS AND LOSERS 
There are winners, where overspending is rife and year after year seems to go unchecked. And 
there are losers who never receive anything like full disbursement even of the monies that 
Parliament has voted, let alone the larger amounts they requested during the annual budget 
preparations. So, however much the issue of 'financial indiscipline' in the public sector is a 
matter for executive-legislative relations and is not confined within the bureaucratic realm, the 
problem also features in relations within the political executive (and, indeed within ruling 
party). This point merits elaboration. 
The distorting effects of 'financial indiscipline' on the distribution of scarce public 
resources have consistently favoured spending on general services, the machinery of state, 
rather than functions directly relevant to the economy and social well-being. An example is the 
overnment's annual spending on cell phone usage of K50 billion, which equates to the entire 
health sector budget. In 1999 MOFED released only K6million of the K1billion budget for 
tackling the scourge of HIV/AIDS (almost one fifth of the adult population aged 15-49 is 
currently HIV infected). The Supplementary and Excess Appropriations appear to have 
consistently benefited the same ministries and departments, like the Ministry of Defence, more 
than others such as for education and health. Perhaps most notable of all among the 'winners' 
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have been the Office of the President - Cabinet Office and Office of the President - State 
House, the budget vote for which contains the President's discretionary fund (often dubbed the 
'presidential slush fund'). The sums disbursed regularly exceed by far the Estimates voted by 
Parliament, which finds it difficult to identify the recipients.xxxvii The President's capacity to 
project himself as chief patron of the nation is enhanced accordingly, so accentuating his own 
power relative to the rest of government. For example there is the building programme first 
announced by the President and called the Presidential Housing Initiative (PHI), which 
appears to have been underwritten by proceeds from the sale of council houses. The PAC 
called the PHI a 'legally non-existing entity with no powers whatsoever to collect rents which 
should otherwise be collected by the Ministry of Land', and 'neither a department nor an agent 
of government engaged in revenue collection'.xxxviii  In 2001 this entity is reputed to have 
borrowed $18 million without MOFED's sanction for the purpose of housing guests to the 
June summit of the Organisation of African Unity in Lusaka, for which the total budget 
exceeded the budgets for public health and education.xxxix
'Financial indiscipline' also allows public spending to favour Lusaka, the seat of 
government, relative to the rest of the country and the rural areas, where the majority of poor 
people live. The deepest poverty is in areas furthest away from the capital.  The constituencies 
of MPs from the ruling party and indeed the President's own province (Luapula) can be 
preferred against constituencies that return opposition party and Independent MPs.xl Spending 
can be finely tuned to the exigencies of persuading voters to support the government in 
parliamentary by-elections.xli MPs who are out of favour with the president or have no 
bargaining power can be discriminated against. No less important, the institutions of 
governance whose formal rationale is to check abuses of executive power can be penalised, by 
MOFED's control over the release of funds. Thus the instruments of 'horizontal 
accountability'xlii that are supposed to work alongside the National Assembly and which 
complement Parliament's position as a leading instrument of vertical accountability are 
themselves held in check - no less than is the National Assembly which similarly does not 
dictate its own budget.  
The judiciary, the Commission for Investigations (which since 1974 has existed to 
handle complaints from the public against acts of injustice or maladministration by state 
organs, but between 1992 and 1998 was unable even to compile annual reports for Parliament, 
because of insufficient funds) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) are all cases in 
point. Of the K133.5 million approved by Parliament for institutional capacity-building at the 
ACC in 1999 not a single Kwacha had been made available to it as of 10 November 1999.xliii 
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In fact MOFED released no funds for use by the Commissioners in either 1997 or 1998. The 
AG is another very pertinent example. It has consistently been underfunded both absolutely 
and relative to the Estimates approved by Parliament, something that the PAC has consistently 
brought to the government's attention. For instance the PAC's report on 1998 noted that only 
76 per cent of the amount voted by Parliament was actually released to the AG (and was 
released only intermittently), and this represented barely 30 per cent of the original budget 
request put to MOFED. In his report for 1996 the AG noted that only 49 per cent of his 
approved budget was actually released. And of the amount provided, only 23 per cent was 
released by the time in August when all audit inquiries for the year in question should have 
been completed. The AG in 1998 had a shortfall of 54 officers compared to the establishment 
entitlement of 194 officers (grades down to the level of Assistant Audit Examiner). Thus 
although the laws of Zambia say the AG 'shall not be subject to the direction or control of any 
other person or authority' (Act No. 8 of 1980), the Office's ability to discharge its 
responsibilities is circumscribed by the simple expedient of denying it adequate resources.  
Finally, in the economy some entrepreneurs including traders and 'middlemen' with 
good political connections (including government ministers and other and MMD MPs) have 
benefited from the 'financial indiscipline', through activities like public procurement. Others 
including some local private manufacturers and parastatal entities like ZESCO have been less 
fortunate. They are now owed large amounts by government as consumer of their product (this 
puts them in thrall to the government); some have been bankrupted as a result. At the very 
least private investment will not bear fruit where the government's financial mismanagement 
renders it unable to provide vital infrastructures like bridges and roads.xliv  
To explain how this situation can persist we need to visit the budget process.  
 
THE BUDGET PROCESS 
The budget process is central to the relationship between the executive and legislature. The 
Estimates of expenditure are considered by the Committee of Supply and taxation proposals 
by the Committee of Ways and Means, both being committees of the whole house. The 
recently introduced Estimates Committee is mandated to consider the budget system - a remit 
described in terms of 15 objectives that conclude with an entitlement to suggest ways and 
means of improving the present system. Its other main objective is to consider the draft budget 
estimates for the coming year. While being too recent an innovation for us to assess the 
Committee's contribution to making government more open, transparent and accountable, its 
first report, presented to the House in November 2000, was a major analytical exercise. It 
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highlighted 'significant deficiencies in all phases of the budgetary process: drafting, 
legislating, implementation and audit'; it advanced no less than 54 substantial 
recommendations for reform. Although the report 'was not liked' by government, the 
Committee's future seems reasonably securexlv (the membership was renewed for 2001) and it 
looks like becoming a very useful companion to the PAC. 
In its inaugural year the Estimates Committee rightly gave priority to considering the 
entire budget procedure over the content of the forthcoming budget. It expressed concern that 
the process, format and timing of the budget all obstruct transparency and public participation.  
In particular the budget as approved by Parliament is not an accurate indicator of the actual 
amount and pattern of spending.  The Committee placed responsibility for this at the door of 
cash budgeting, introduced in 1993 as a device to disallow monetary financing of expenditure, 
and MOFED's practice of raising money by issuing Treasury Bills (and more recently, bonds 
as well). The constraints on spending that become necessary if the government is to comply 
with cash budgeting fall unevenly across the public sector, with decisions being taken in line 
with political dictates as already explained. Treasury Bills lie outside parliament's control and 
may be used to fund expenditures outside the Estimates. When the time comes to redeem the 
bills from the general revenue the cost may be born by cuts in budgeted items of expenditure 
that were approved by parliament. 
Expenditures that fall outside or go beyond the Estimates voted by Parliament are 
submitted for retrospective approval, in the form of Supplementary Appropriations. These can 
be submitted for parliamentary approval up to two years in arrears although, as happened in 
September 1998 the government sometimes exceeds that limit. The sums typically represent 
between 4 and 8 per cent of the original appropriation.  In addition there are Excess 
Expenditure Appropriations, which are usually for amounts half as much again. These are 
supposed to be submitted for approval not more than 30 months after the end of the financial 
year in which the expenditure occurred. In practice they have been presented as late as six 
years afterwards. The Excess Expenditure Appropriation Bills for 1994, 1995 and 1997 were 
only brought forward in 2000.  These bills are intended to regularise unauthorised spending 
detected by the AG's inquiries; in 1995 and 1996 they amounted to around 12 per cent of 
actual government expenditure. 
Basically requests for Supplementary and Excess Appropriations present Parliament 
with a fait accompli. Officials in MOFED and the spending departments know this and are not 
intimidated. In the Committee's view the cash budget, which was introduced at the behest of 
the international donors as a device to stop inflationary spending, has undermined the 'rule of 
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law'. Spending departments and MOFED's manipulation of cash releases 'face few legal 
constraints on shifting funds between subheads during the course of the fiscal year'.xlvi  
MOFED has been able to interpret its powers as 'a carte blanche for unilaterally deciding 
which of those activities approved by Parliament will actually be funded'. This makes the 
budget 'an inconsequential document due to the disjunction between budgeted expenditures 
and the actual expenditures'; the budget becomes merely 'an academic exercise'.xlvii  The 
considerable time the house sits as Committee of Supply (much of the sitting from January to 
April) is made redundant as a means of legislative control.  In 1997 for instance the financial 
outturn represented a net under-expenditure of 31 per cent of the authorised total budget; in 
contrast 25 per cent of what was actually spent had not been authorised at all by the 
Appropriation Act.xlviii
Moreover the tabling of the Estimates in January means that by the time Parliament 
gets round to voting on the government's proposals the financial year (equals the calendar 
year) is already well under way. Hence the Estimates Committee has proposed that the 
Estimates (the 'Yellow Book') be made available in October, which would enable the budget to 
complete its passage through the house by January. Alternatively the start of the financial year 
could be put back to April. These proposals would have a deeper significance, by shifting the 
burden of the proceedings away from the floor of the house.  There MPs use the occasion 
mainly to press for more public spending in their constituencies - a representational function 
akin to what Norris calls 'service responsiveness'. Instead the Committee's proposals call for a 
more considered deliberation of policy ('policy responsiveness').xlix The intention is that 
parliamentarians should be more proactive and engage in medium to long term strategic 
thinking, rather than be largely reactive and function as the voice of immediate needs. A 
further recommendation by the Estimates Committee is that Parliament be allowed to vote an 
increase in some heads beyond what the government proposes so long as it compensates with 
reductions elsewhere in the total budget, leaving a revenue-neutral effect. 
With respect to the budget format, the Committee recommends a more transparent 
layout that would enable clear comparisons to be made between the original Estimates and the 
actual expenditures in the final outturn, so providing a more informative basis for the 
following year's budget deliberations. Also, some MPs want the annual spending proposals to 
be disaggregated on a constituency basis, which would make it easier to judge the overall 
distribution as between different parts of the country and to identify how much is being spent, 
and on what, in their own area. The demand reflects suspicion of the executive's influence over 
actual spending allocations. It also represents a desire by MPs to have the means to persuade 
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their own electors that they are 'bringing home the pork'l (even though that in turn rests on 
their clientelistic relationship with government leaders and State House, rather than the depth 
of their personal commitment to their constituents). The MPs' contribution to debates such as 
in the Committee of Supply and their questions to ministers strongly suggest that government 
spending in their locality dominates, to the exclusion of almost everything else, their 
perception of their role. It determines their chances of re-election, even though their 
nomination depends first on not alienating party leaders. Candidate selection is highly 
centralised (for example the National Executive Committee controls the process in the MMD). 
In short, MPs too are engaged in a patron-client relationship with their constituents. The most 
frequent requests tend to be for development projects like new roads, electrification, fertiliser 
distribution and agricultural loans, improved schooling and, in dry areas, boreholes.li A recent 
Zambian perspective is that the Parliament 'has become like an auction floor for making 
decisions based on patronage, not principle. It is dividing spoils and not discussing issues for 
the common good of the people'.lii Presidential systems in general perhaps encourage this kind 
of scenario. But it is accentuated in countries like Zambia where patron-client links continue to 
be fundamental, and where the 'populace expects to exchange political support for concrete 
help: that is the only way in which politics makes sense to them'.liii It has not obviously helped 
Zambia to make economic and social progress. 
 
RECENT PROGRESS, FUTURE PROSPECTS 
The story so far is one of endemic 'financial indiscipline' in the public sector.  It is deeply 
rooted and not just a recent development.  Indeed, in giving evidence to the Constitution 
Commission in 1990 the Office of the Auditor-General said 'the Executive have come to take 
for granted that no action or non implementation of the recommendations (of the Public 
Accounts Committee) is not punishable'.liv The AG's latest findings indicate the problems 
persist unabated. The AG's report for 1999 draws attention to over Kwacha32.9 billion in 
misappropriation and misapplication including sums at State House, and says it is apparent 
that MOFED 'has not taken any serious reviews of the internal control system'.lv  It is safe to 
assume that the country's development prospects continue to be undermined. The cry of 
'insufficient funds' features in over a third of the explanations the government routinely offers 
for its failure to execute promises and the undertakings it makes to the house. Its Action-Taken 
Reports identify capital projects as the chief victims; 'still looking for funds' is a common form 
of reply.  
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For this situation to improve it is worth distinguishing between the kinds of 
incremental reform that might help to improve the functioning of the AG and PAC within an 
unchanged political context, and more fundamental changes to the underlying conditions. 
 
Modest Incremental Reforms 
The second half of the 1990s saw some signs that the problem was at last being recognised and 
there were a few steps forward. There was a greater commitment by the state to prepare and 
submit annual financial reports.lvi Formerly, the late or non-production of financial accounts 
had seriously hindered the work of the AG and PAC. Numerous queries raised by the AG as 
far back as the 1970s had not been replied to as late as 1995. In 1998 Parliament's Committee 
on Public Investments, while reporting the establishment of a special committee of officials 
from the Clerk's Office, Cabinet Office and AG to eliminate outstanding issues, still 
complained of the lack of real progress, naming the Secretary to the Treasury and Director of 
State Enterprises as culprits.lvii A 'lackadaisical attitude' is still said to persist among many 
Controlling Officers and their accounting personnel.lviii Similarly MOFED protests that delays 
in obtaining the necessary data from government departments will make it difficult to bring 
the budget process forward. Yet there has been a considerable amount of hard work by the 
PAC and support staff to address the backlog, enabling it to produce no less than five reports 
in 1998, including the reports for 1994 and 1945. Any return to the pattern of delay by 
government departments in rendering their accounts will once again impair the effectiveness 
of parliamentary scrutiny.  The PAC has often observed that by the time an erring party has 
been identified, in many cases he/she has died or taken retirement or been retrenched.  
Some thought has also been given to improving the institutional framework for 
exacting financial accountability. At the state opening of Parliament on 19 January 2001 the 
President announced proposals to expand the scope and decentralise the operations of the AG. 
The Parliamentary Reform Committee, a select committee appointed in February 1999, finally 
presented its Report on Reforms in the Zambian Parliament (November 2000), after setbacks 
arising from MPs' concerns about the restricted terms of reference and government objections 
to proposals that might increase Parliament's relative. In March 2001 the Speaker announced 
the formation of a new committee to consider the implementation of the Report's 
recommendations. Among the 73 recommendations were seven to reform the budget process 
along lines favoured by the Estimates Committee.lix The Reform Committee reckoned that six 
of the seven recommendations could be effected in the short-term and one in the medium term, 
and reckoned that three of them were financially inexpensive, two moderately expensive and 
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only two were expensive. These changes, if implemented in the form intended by the Report, 
should make a modest contribution to tackling the problem of financial indiscipline in the 
executive. 
 
More Fundamental Changes 
Even the most enthusiastic advocates of 'new (or neo-)institutionalism' in social science 
acknowledge that the operation of government organisations is influenced by the more general 
political environment and the social and cultural surroundings, and that institutional 
engineering alone does not offer a panacea. In Zambia not simply the pace of substantive 
institutional reform but the rate of informal behavioural compliance with the values and 
aspirations underlying reform tend to be rather slow. Even the initial membership of 
Parliament's committee on implementing the parliamentary reforms came under threat almost 
as soon as it was announced. (Because they opposed moves to enable Chiluba to serve a third 
term as president, some of the members faced expulsion from the party and the possibility of 
losing their parliamentary seats).  
Most importantly dominant interests in the political executive face a trade-off from the 
agenda for reform. On the one side there is the possibility that a reformed budget process and 
more effective (that is, enforceable) financial accountability could lead to improvement in 
policy performance. This, together with an enhanced reputation for probity in administration 
should enhance the electoral appeal of the ruling party. Reductions in the misallocation, 
misuse and misappropriation of scarce public funds, and more reliable arrangements for 
raising non-tax revenues could win friends in the business community. This is because the 
practice of issuing Treasury Bills and taking unauthorised overdrafts from the central bank 
drains society's limited pool of savings, crowding out small businesses and commercial 
farmers from the market for capital or causing high interest charges.lx Greater confidence in 
the government's financial management - which means becoming more predictable and less 
subject to arbitrary political interference - should make the country more attractive to foreign 
investors. It would strengthen the government's hand in negotiations with foreign donors. For 
just as the government alludes to its ties to the international financial institutions and donor 
unpredictability as factors impeding full accountability to Parliament, so MPs have invoked 
Zambia's aid dependence to support their case for reform, warning that without stronger 
financial discipline Zambia will become an international economic pariah.lxiAt the same time 
the donors themselves should exercise more care to avoid funding expenditures in ways that 
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lead their public sector partners to ignore, escape or lose the ability to comply with a suitable 
financial control regime. 
On the other side, however, politicians have a vested interest in retaining areas of  
political discretion especially in matters financial, as befits the established neo-patrimonial and 
clientelistic approach to maintaining and exercising power. From the perspective of 
government leaders who control and manipulate public patronage, there are advantages in an 
unreformed status quo. For instance if Parliament was to acquire a stronger sense of ownership 
of the budget then it might be less willing to approve Supplementary and Excess 
Appropriation Acts.  
Thus while a strengthening of the formal institutional mechanisms is necessary it is 
very unlikely to be sufficient for the installation of greater financial discipline in the public 
sector. In the past the government has behaved as if it believed the scrutiny activities of the 
PAC constituted an end in itself - a sufficient response to the problem, one that obviated the 
need for government to take special action. But even though the PAC is a dog that increasingly 
barks, the fact is, it still has no bite: 'It seems as if, year in and year out ' the annual 
presentation of the PAC report 'is for record purposes only'; its recommendations 'should not 
only end in our draws. The Executive must act on some of these recommendations'.lxii  As 
with all the other committees the chief threat the PAC can make is to keep revisiting the same 
issues over and over again. This will not worry a government that feels secure. And the 
government will feel secure so long as the ruling party dominates the house. First there is the 
'payroll' vote numbering up to 68 MPs. Second, the great majority of  back-benchers take no 
part in the debates on the PAC reports, which tend to be monopolised by the Committee's 
members and ministers who reply. In 1997 and 1998 only three MMD back-bench MPs came 
anywhere close to the average number of interventions made by the handful of opposition 
party and Independent MPs. Thus an essential condition for reformed arrangements of 
parliamentary accountability to be effective is a more genuinely pluralist party system, where 
a strong political opposition is minded to put the government under pressure. 
A second necessary condition is a package of constitutional measures that goes beyond 
the budget process and the immediate mechanisms for financial accountability. For example 
an entitlement by Parliament to pass a motion of censure or vote of no confidence in ministers 
individually and collectively would be a major development, linking sanctions to 
accountability and the possibility of enforceability. The recommendations of the PAC and 
Estimate Committee should be conceived as part of a broader review of executive-legislative 
relations, one that went beyond even the mandate of the Parliamentary Reform Committee. 
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There is an outside possibility that just such a review might take place if the general elections 
due at the end of October 2001 produce a change of government. But even then the 
consequences cannot be predicted with certainty. For example any changes that made 
ministers or the party in power feel less secure could have the effect of introducing greater 
party discipline into committee proceedings.  This would be made even more likely if the 
press were in attendance, as the parliamentary reforms committee recommends. A 
confrontational atmosphere that eroded the cross-party approach to committee work would not 
be an advance on the present situation and could be counter-productive.  
The Zambian state cannot possibly be expected to meet all of the country's many 
urgent social and economic needs. That said, the evidence suggests that the government has 
often used lack of money as an excuse for inaction and its reluctance to strengthen the 
institutions of accountability, when financial mismanagement has been an important constraint 
on progress. High-level political corruption represents only the 'tip of the iceberg'. 'Financial 
indiscipline' has been endemic throughout the public sector. None of the specific proposals for 
reform, however affordable, offer a guaranteed solution. If a new generation of politicians 
manoeuvres close to power then they too might be seduced by proximity to the resources at 
the government's disposal. Without some sort of cultural change there is always the risk that 
traditional approaches which appear to treat public expenditure more as an instrument for the 
exercise and retention of power than as a means to promote national development, will 
continue to prevail. There needs to be a shift in the public philosophy toward a performance-
based system - one where the government's performance is judged in non-particularistic, non-
patrimonial terms. A sea change in the bureaucratic culture is also required. For at the end of 
the day responsibility for many of the shortcomings highlighted by the AG and PAC lies not 
so much with the absence of a watertight regulatory regime but with a systematic failure to 
apply the existing regulations and internal control mechanisms.  So, while the PAC and 
Estimates Committee recommendations constitute steps in the right direction in so far as they 
might alter the balance of incentive structures, we should beware of inflated expectations 
about the probable results. 
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